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Abstract: 
This paper examines the social efficiency of managerial liability rules when firms may 
cause negative externality. If courts fail to recognize potential negative externality in a 
firm’s activities, then they can mistakenly find managers who may have prevented the 
externality at a cost to the firm beforehand liable for breaches of fiduciary duty to 
shareholders, and mistakenly impose legal liability sanctions on the managers. This 
possibility discourages managers from choosing socially optimal actions. To overcome 
this problem, I suggest that managers, not shareholders, should be directly liable for 
negative externality and that managers’ fiduciary duty to shareholders should be 
restricted. 
JEL classification: G34; G38; K22 
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This paper examines the social efficiency of managerial liability rules when firms may 
cause negative externality. I suggest that managers, not shareholders, should be directly 
liable for negative externality caused by corporate activities, and that managers’ 
fiduciary duty to shareholders should be restricted. This suggestion arises from two 
presumptions: that there is a legal error by which courts fail to adequately recognize an 
external harm caused by corporate activities, and that legal processes are necessary to 
impose penalties (or negative compensation) on managers. 
     Shareholders finally bear the cost of an external harm caused by corporate 
activities if courts can adequately internalize the externality. Therefore, shareholders 
motivate managers to attain the social optimum, irrespective of whether the legal 
liability sanctions for the externality are directly imposed on shareholders or on 
managers.1 Hence, managers act as agents of shareholders to solve the problem causing 
the negative externality. 
     However, if courts fail to internalize an external harm and legal liability sanctions 
imposed on managers for breaches of fiduciary duty to shareholders are restricted, then 
there is a social difference between the legal liability sanctions for the negative 
                                                
1 See Becker (1968) for internalization of negative externality. 
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externality being directly imposed on shareholders or managers. The reason for this is 
as follows. When shareholders are directly liable for an external harm, they ignore the 
externality if a legal error sufficiently lowers the expected sanctions for the externality 
imposed on them.2 In contrast, when managers are directly liable for an external harm, 
restriction of legal liability sanctions imposed on them for breaches of fiduciary duty to 
shareholders has a great influence on the relationship between shareholders’ interests 
and social objectives. Legal liability sanctions are often the only way to impose 
negative compensation on managers. 3  Therefore, reinforcement of legal liability 
sanctions imposed on managers for breaches of fiduciary duty to shareholders makes 
managerial incentive schemes more efficient from the shareholders’ perspectives. 
However, more efficient managerial incentive schemes from the shareholders’ 
                                                
2 As literature on economic consequences of legal error, see, for example, Craswell and Calfee (1986), 
Png (1986), Polinsky and Shavell (1989), Miceli (1990), Davis (1994), and Kaplow and Shavell (1994). 
3 This assumption seems to be realistic because legal processes are often necessary to seize managers’ 
property after the results of their performance, whereas firms have difficulty in keeping managers’ 
property before the results of their performance. As a model similar to this framework, see Gutierrez 
(2003). As literature on limited liability constraints in principal-agent models, see, for example, 
Holmstrom (1979), Lewis (1980), Sappington (1983), Demski, Sappington, and Spiller (1988), Innes 
(1990), Park (1995), Kim (1997), Demougin and Fuet (1998), Lewis and Sappington (2000, 2001), and 
Laux (2001). 
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perspectives are not necessarily more favorable from a social perspective when 
corporate activities may cause negative externality. If courts fail to recognize potential 
negative externality in an firm’s activities, then they can mistakenly find managers who 
may have prevented the externality at a cost to the firm beforehand liable for breaches 
of fiduciary duty to shareholders. Therefore, they mistakenly impose legal liability 
sanctions on the managers. 
When legal liability sanctions imposed for breaches of fiduciary duty are 
sufficiently large, managers are discouraged, even if they are directly liable for an 
external harm, from choosing socially optimal actions. That is, reinforcement of 
fiduciary duty to shareholders can threaten managers not to choose socially optimal 
actions that are against shareholders’ interests, irrespective of whether legal liability for 
negative externality is imposed on shareholders or managers. In contrast, when legal 
liability sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty are restricted, shareholders cannot 
impose penalties on managers for acting against shareholders’ interests and, instead, 
have to pay additional rewards to managers for obeying shareholders (acting against 
social objectives) if managers are directly liable for negative externality. That is, a 
restriction of legal liability sanctions imposed on managers for breaches of fiduciary 
duty can raise the cost of motivating managers to act against social objectives and to 
89 5 
obey shareholders. Consequently, this can mitigate the conflict between shareholders’ 
interests and social objectives. 
Thus, by imposing legal liability for negative externality on managers and 
restricting legal liability imposed for managers’ breaches of fiduciary duty to 
shareholders, courts may be able to attain the social optimum even if they cannot 
sufficiently internalize the externality. In other words, managers should not just be 
agents of shareholders who are directly liable for negative externality, but should be 
directly liable for the externality. At the same time, managers’ fiduciary duty should be 
balanced with other legal liabilities imposed on them.4 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section I presents the 
benchmark model in which negative compensation paid to managers is unlimited, that is, 
where legal liability sanctions imposed on managers for breaches of fiduciary duty are 
unnecessary. Section II analyzes this model and shows that shareholders motivate 
managers to attain the social optimum if and only if courts adequately internalize 
negative externality, irrespective of whether the legal liability for the externality is 
imposed on shareholders or managers. Section III shows that the nonnegative constraint 
                                                
4 On substitutability of the principal and agent liability, see, for example, Polinsky and Shavell (1993), 
Arlen (1994), Chu and Qian (1995), Shavell (1997), Privileggi et al. (2001), and Mattiacci and Parisi 
(2004). However, these studies do not explicitly analyze the relationship between managers’ liability 
related to social harms and their fiduciary duty to shareholders. 
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of managerial compensation can raise the cost of motivating managers to act against 
social objectives and to obey shareholders when managers are directly liable for 
negative externality. Section IV introduces legal liability for breaches of fiduciary duty 
into managerial incentive schemes. It is shown that reinforcement of legal liability 
sanctions imposed on managers for breaches of fiduciary duty can threaten them so that 
they do not choose socially optimal actions that are against shareholders’ interests. 
Section V draws concludes. 
 
I. The benchmark model: The case in which negative compensation is unlimited 
Consider a firm that has an opportunity to implement one of two Projects, A  and B . 
Let   
€ 
Ri  denote a return from Project   
€ 
i  net of investment costs, where   
€ 
i ∈ A,B{ } . 
Project A  involves no negative externality while Project B  causes an external harm 
E  with probability π . That is, a causal relationship between Project B  and its 
negative externality is uncertain. This would be the case, for example, in respect of the 
possibility and gravity of pollutant leakage from a factory. However, this causality can 
be correctly recognized only by the firm’s manager before project selection. Therefore, 
the firm’s shareholders have to delegate project selection to the manager, but the 
realized return reveals the project actually chosen by the manager. After the outcome of 
91 7 
the chosen project is realized, the court imperfectly recognizes the causal relationship 
between Project   
€ 
B and its negative externality: if Project   
€ 
B causes the external harm 
E , the court correctly finds this causality with probability Cp ; if Project B  involves 
no negative externality, the court correctly recognizes this fact with probability Np . 
The court’s ability to find the causal relationship is assumed to be independent of the 
manager’s project selection. That is, when the manager does not implement Project B , 
the court estimates the potential negative externality of this project from similar cases.5 
Assume that 1>+ NC pp : the court’s ruling contains useful information on whether 
project B  causes negative externality. 
In addition, assume the following condition: 
 
          
€ 
0 ≤ RB − E AR< EpR CB −< .                                     (1) 
                                                
5 In reality, the court’s ability to find the causal relationship between Project B and its negative 
externality may depend on which project the manager chose. For example, when the manager 
implemented Project B, the court may be able to directly observe the fact that the manager caused the 
external harm E. However, even if the court’s ability to find the causal relationship is assumed to depend 
on the manager’s project selection, the following analysis is fundamentally unchanged. It is essential for 
this paper that there is a time lag between when the manager and the court recognize the causal 
relationship.  
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The first inequality of (1) means that limited liability of shareholders is not binding 
because the court can impose all of the external harm E  on the firm (i.e., on the 
shareholders).6 The second inequality means that if Project B  causes the external 
harm E , then Project A  is socially more acceptable than Project B . The final 
inequality means that if Project B  involves no negative externality, then Project B  is 
socially more acceptable than Project A . However, this inequality means that when the 
court imposes the compensatory damage E  on the firm that was held liable for 
negative externality, the expected liability sanction EpC  imposed on the firm that 
caused the external harm E  is sufficiently low such that Project B  is always more 
beneficial to shareholders than Project A . In other words, if a legal liability sanction 
D  satisfying   
€ 
RB − pC D < RA < RB − 1− pN( )D , i.e., satisfying 
 
        <<− D
p
RR
C
AB
N
AB
p
RR
−
−
1
                                         (2) 
 
                                                
6 This condition is not essential. If   
€ 
E  is greater than   
€ 
RB , i.e., if limited liability of shareholders is 
binding, the legal liability sanction for negative externality is not   
€ 
E  but   
€ 
RB . However, in this case, if 
inequality (1) is replaced by   
€ 
0 < RA < RB − pC RB , the following analysis is invariant. 
93 9 
is imposed on the firm that was held liable for the external harm E , the conflict 
between shareholders’ interests and social objectives disappear. The first inequality of 
(2) assures that the shareholders choose Project A  when Project B  causes negative 
externality. The second inequality assures that the shareholders choose Project B  
when it involves no negative externality. However, for the remainder of this paper it is 
assumed that the court imposes only the compensatory damage E  and does not impose 
punitive damage on the firm. That is, the court cannot adequately internalize negative 
externality.7 
     Assume that 
 
          
€ 
πRA + 1−π( )RB − 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E − u > 0 ,                          (3) 
 
where   
€ 
u  (  
€ 
≥ 0) denotes the manager’s reservation level of utility. Inequality (3) assures 
that the firm gains from the socially optimal project selection on condition that the 
                                                
7 Punitive damages tend to be restricted in many countries. This tendency is strengthened when corporate 
social responsibilities are gradually made into law. Even if punitive damages are not restricted, courts are 
likely to underestimate their legal error. Therefore, they may not be able to impose sufficiently large 
liability sanctions on defendants. 
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expected net compensation paid to the manager is u . This inequality also assures that 
the socially optimal project selection yields a positive social surplus: ARπ  
  
€ 
+ 1−π( )RB u− 0> . 
     The timing of the game is as follows. At 1=t , the firm’s shareholders offer the 
following contract to the manager: the shareholders pay   
€ 
Wi  to the manager when a 
return   
€ 
Ri is realized, where   
€ 
i ∈ A, B{ } . At 2=t , the manager recognizes whether 
Project B  will cause the external harm E  or not and decides which project to choose. 
At 3=t , a return from the project chosen by the manager is realized. At 4=t , if the 
manager chooses Project B  at 2=t , those exposed to the danger of the external harm 
E  necessarily accuse the manager. If the court finds the negative externality of Project 
B , a legal liability sanction E  is imposed on the shareholders or the manager. For 
simplicity, all legal costs are assumed to be zero. Importantly, legal liability sanctions 
are finally borne by the shareholders even if they are directly imposed on the manager. 
In fact, as shown in the next section, if negative compensation paid to the manager is 
unlimited, there is no social difference between whether legal liability sanctions for 
negative externality are directly imposed on the shareholders or on the manager. 
However, this conclusion is untrue if negative compensation is limited, as shown later. 
 
95 11 
II. Managerial incentives in the benchmark model 
Assume that negative compensation paid to the manager is unlimited. Then, it is shown 
that the most beneficial project selection for the shareholders is to choose Project B  
irrespective of whether it will cause negative externality or not. For the remainder of 
this section, the legal liability for the external harm   
€ 
E  is directly imposed on the 
manager. This setting is not essential because when negative compensation is unlimited, 
there is no social difference between the legal liability for negative externality being 
directly imposed on the shareholders or on the manager, as shown below. Let 
  
€ 
WA
* ,WB
*( )  
denote a pair of   
€ 
WA ,WB( )  that maximizes shareholders’ profit when negative 
compensation paid to the manager is unlimited. There are four cases, as follows: 
 
     Case 1: choosing Project A  when Project B  will cause negative externality 
and choosing Project B  when it will involve no negative externality; 
     Case 2: choosing Project B  irrespective of whether it will cause negative 
externality or not; 
     Case 3: choosing Project A  irrespective of whether Project B  will cause 
negative externality or not; 
     Case 4: choosing Project B  when it will cause negative externality and choosing 
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Project A  when Project B  will involve no negative externality. 
 
Case 1 is socially optimal as assumed in (1). Whereas, Case 4 can be ignored as it is 
never chosen by the shareholders because if they prefer Project A  over Project B  
even when Project B  involves no negative externality, this preference is strengthened 
when Project B  will cause negative externality. Managerial incentive schemes in 
Cases 1~3 are as follows. 
Firstly, consider managerial incentive schemes in Case 1. At 1=t , the 
shareholders offer a contract   
€ 
WA ,WB( )  to the manager in order to motivate him/her to 
choose Project A  when Project B  will cause negative externality and to choose 
Project B  when it will involve no negative externality. Then, the manager’s 
participation constraint is 
 
          
€ 
πWA + 1−π( )WB − 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E ≥ u .                             (4) 
 
The manager’s incentive compatibility constraint is 
 
          
€ 
WB − pC E ≤WA ≤WB − 1− pN( )E .                                 (5) 
97 13 
 
The shareholders maximize their profit   
€ 
πRA + 1−π( )RB   
€ 
−πWA − 1−π( )WB  subject to (4) 
and (5). This is equivalent to minimizing   
€ 
πWA + 1−π( )WB  subject to (4) and (5). 
Therefore, 
 
          
€ 
πWA
* + 1−π( )WB* = u + 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E ;                            (6) 
 
          
€ 
u − 1−π( ) pC + pN −1( )E ≤WA* ≤ u .                               (7) 
 
The bold line in Figure 1 shows the region of a pair of 
  
€ 
WA
* ,WB
*( )  in Case 1. It follows 
from (6) that the shareholders’ profit is 
 
       
€ 
πRA + 1−π( )RB −πWA* − 1−π( )WB*  
  
€ 
= πRA + 1−π( )RB   
€ 
− 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E − u , 
 
which is equal to (3). 
Secondly, consider managerial incentive schemes in Case 2. At 1=t , the 
shareholders offer a contract   
€ 
WA ,WB( )  to the manager in order to motivate him/her to 
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choose Project B  irrespective of whether it will cause negative externality or not. 
Then, the manager’s participation constraint is 
 
        
  
€ 
WB − πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E ≥ u .                                (8) 
 
The manager’s incentive compatibility constraints are 
 
          
€ 
WB − pC E ≥WA ;                                               (9) 
 
          
€ 
WB − 1− pN( )E ≥WA .      
 
Because the latter inequality is assured by the former inequality (9), the shareholders 
maximize their profit   
€ 
RB −WB  subject to (8) and (9). This is equivalent to minimizing 
  
€ 
WB  subject to (8) and (9). Therefore, 
 
          
€ 
WA
* ≤ u − 1−π( ) pC + pN −1( )E ;                                  (10) 
 
        
  
€ 
WB
* = u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E .                               (11) 
99 15 
 
The bold line in Figure 2 shows the region of a pair of 
  
€ 
WA
* ,WB
*( )  in Case 2. It follows 
from (11) that the shareholders’ profit is 
 
        *BB WR −    
€ 
= RB − πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E − u .                      (12) 
 
Finally, consider managerial incentive schemes in Case 3. At 1=t , the 
shareholders offer a contract   
€ 
WA ,WB( )  to the manager in order to motivate him/her to 
choose Project A  irrespective of whether Project B  will cause negative externality 
or not. Then, the manager’s participation constraint is 
 
        uWA ≥ .                                                    (13) 
 
The manager’s incentive compatibility constraints are 
 
        ACB WEpW ≤− ;          
          
€ 
WB − 1− pN( )E ≤WA .                                          (14) 
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Because the former inequality is assured by the latter inequality (14), the shareholders 
maximize their profit AA WR −  subject to (13) and (14). This is equivalent to 
minimizing AW  subject to (13) and (14). Therefore, 
 
        uWA =
* ,                                                    (15)  
 
          
€ 
WB
* ≤ u + 1− pN( )E .                                           (16)  
 
The bold line in Figure 3 shows the region of a pair of 
  
€ 
WA
* ,WB
*( )  in Case 3. It follows 
from (15) that the shareholders’ profit is 
 
        uRWR AAA −=−
* .                                            (17)  
 
     It follows from 1>+ NC pp , (1), (3), (12) and (17) that Case 2 is the best , Case 
1 is the second best, and Case 3 is the worst for the shareholders. Thus, while it is 
socially optimal to choose Project   
€ 
A when Project   
€ 
B will cause negative externality 
and to choose Project   
€ 
B  when it will involve no negative externality, it is most 
beneficial for the shareholders that Project   
€ 
B is chosen irrespective of whether it will 
101 17 
cause negative externality or not. 
     The following proposition is obtained. 
 
Proposition 1: When negative compensation paid to the manager is unlimited, there is 
no social difference between the legal liability for negative externality being directly 
imposed on the shareholders or on the manager. 
Proof: All proofs are contained in the Appendix. 
 
As shown in the proof of this proposition, in Cases 1 and 3, even if negative 
compensation is infeasible (i.e., even if   
€ 
WA ≥ 0  and   
€ 
WB ≥ 0 ), the shareholders’ 
profit-maximization problem is independent of whether legal liability for negative 
externality is directly imposed on the shareholders or on the manager. However, in Case 
2, conditions (10) and (11) may not be consistent with   
€ 
WA ≥ 0 and   
€ 
WB ≥ 0 while 
conditions (A. 6) and (A. 7) are always consistent with   
€ 
WA ≥ 0 and   
€ 
WB ≥ 0. Therefore, 
the shareholders’ profit-maximization problem is no longer independent of whether 
legal liability for negative externality is directly imposed on the shareholders or on the 
manager. This problem is examined in the subsequent sections. 
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III. The nonnegative constraint of managerial compensation and the legal liability for 
negative externality 
As shown in the previous section, when negative compensation paid to the manager is 
unlimited, shareholders have an incentive to adopt the socially inefficient project 
selection, i.e., to choose Project   
€ 
B  irrespective of whether it will cause negative 
externality. This section assumes that managerial compensation cannot be negative: 
0≥AW  and 0≥BW . To motivate the manager to choose Project   
€ 
B irrespective of 
whether it will cause negative externality or not (i.e., to motivate him/her to choose 
Case 2), the shareholders have to satisfy the manager’s incentive compatibility 
EpW CB ≥  that is obtained from inequality (9) and 0≥AW . However, the manager’s 
participation constraint remains (8). Therefore, the nonnegative constraint of managerial 
compensation is binding if and only if 
 
          
€ 
pC E   
€ 
> u 
  
€ 
+ πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E ,                              (18) 
 
which is equivalent to  
 
        
  
€ 
pC > 1− pN( ) +
u 
1−π( )E
.                                      (18’) 
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Let 
  
€ 
WA
** ,WB
**( ) denote a pair of   
€ 
WA ,WB( )  that maximizes shareholders’ profit when 
managerial compensation cannot be negative. If (18) is satisfied, 
 
          
€ 
WA
** = 0;                                                   (10’) 
 
          
€ 
WB
** = pC E .                                                 (11’) 
 
Point V in Figure 2 shows the only pair of 
  
€ 
WA
** ,WB
**( ) in Case 2 when (18) holds. 
Parameters exist satisfying (18’) because, by increasing both   
€ 
pC  and   
€ 
E  such that 
  
€ 
RB − pC E( ) − RB − E( )  
€ 
= 1− pC( )E  is kept constant and simultaneously increasing   
€ 
RB ,   
inequalities   
€ 
pC + pN >1, (1), (3) and (18’) can be assured.  
     When (18) is satisfied, it is more costly for the shareholders to motivate the 
manager who is directly liable for negative externality to always choose Project B , 
because the shareholders cannot impose penalties on the manager for acting against 
their interests. Instead, they have to pay additional rewards, given by 
  
€ 
pC E   
€ 
− u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E[ ] , to the manager for obeying them (i.e., for acting 
against social objectives). This may encourage the shareholders to adopt the socially 
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optimal project selection. The shareholders’ profit in Case 2 is 
 
       
€ 
RB −WB
**
  
€ 
= RB − pC E ,                                            (12’) 
 
which is less than (12) when (18) is satisfied. In contrast, the nonnegative constraint of 
managerial compensation is not binding in Cases 1 and 3. 
     It follows from (3), (12’), and (17) that the following proposition is obtained. 
 
Proposition 2: When the nonnegative constraint of managerial compensation is binding, 
i.e., when (18’) is satisfied, the shareholders motivate the manager to always choose the 
socially optimal project if and only if 
 
        
  
€ 
pC >
π RB − RA( ) + u 
E
+ 1−π( ) 1− pN( ) .                            (19) 
 
There exist parameters satisfying (19) because it follows from (1) and (18’) that the 
right-hand side of (19) is 
  
€ 
π RB − RA( )
E   
€ 
+
u + 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E
E   
€ 
< π + 1−π( ) =1, which is 
assured by 
  
€ 
RB − RA
E
<1 and 
  
€ 
1− pN( ) +
u 
1−π( )E
<1. Inequality (19) can be transformed 
into 
105 21 
 
       
€ 
π RB − pC E( ) − RA{ } <
  
€ 
pC E
WB
**
 − u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E[ ]
WB
*
             
, 
 
which means that the cost to the shareholders of motivating the manager to always 
choose Project   
€ 
B is greater than the benefit to them of doing so. 
     Thus, when a penalty is directly imposed on managers for acting against social 
objectives, a penalty for acting against shareholders’ interests is also necessary to 
motivate managers to obey shareholders (to act against social objectives). However, the 
nonnegative constraint of managerial compensation makes it infeasible to impose the 
latter penalty on managers. Instead, it forces shareholders to pay additional rewards to 
managers for obeying them. This can raise the cost of motivating managers to act 
against social objectives and to obey shareholders. Consequently, this can mitigate the 
conflict between shareholders’ interests and social objectives. Note that the nonnegative 
constraint of managerial compensation is not binding when the shareholders are directly 
liable for negative externality, as shown in (A. 4) and (A. 5). Hence, there is a social 
difference between legal liability sanctions for negative externality being directly 
imposed on shareholders or on managers. In contrast, introduction of legal liability 
Legal Error, Managerial Liability and Negative Externality
106
横浜市立大学論叢社会科学系列　2013：Vol.64　No.3
 22 
sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty to shareholders into managerial incentive 
schemes can be a substitute for negative compensation imposed on managers and may 
exacerbate the conflict between shareholders’ interests and social objectives. This 
problem is examined in the next section. 
 
IV. Introduction of fiduciary duty into managerial incentive schemes 
At 4=t , if the manager chooses Project A  at 2=t , the shareholders necessarily 
accuse the manager of breaches of fiduciary duty to them. If the court does not find the 
potential negative externality of Project   
€ 
B , a legal liability sanction AB RR −  is 
imposed on the manager for breaches of fiduciary duty. The court recognizes, with 
probability   
€ 
pN , that Project   
€ 
B will involve no negative externality and imposes a 
sanction AB RR −  on the manager who chose Project A  for breaches of fiduciary duty. 
However, the court fails to recognize, with probability   
€ 
1− pC , that Project   
€ 
B will 
cause negative externality and mistakenly imposes a sanction AB RR −  on the manager 
who chose Project A . Let 
  
€ 
WA
*** ,WB
***( ) denote a pair of ( )BA WW ,  that maximizes the 
shareholders’ profit when managerial compensation cannot be negative, but legal 
liability sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty are imposed on the manager. 
     In Case 1, the manager’s participation constraint is 
107 23 
 
          
€ 
πWA + 1−π( )WB −π 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ) − 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E ≥ u .           (4’) 
 
The manager’s incentive compatibility constraints are 
 
       
€ 
WB − pC E ≤WA − 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ); 
 
       
€ 
WB − 1− pN( )E ≥WA − pN RB − RA( ), 
 
which are equivalent to 
 
          
€ 
WB + 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ) − pC E ≤WA   
€ 
≤WB + pN RB − RA( ) − 1− pN( )E .     (5’) 
 
Therefore,  
 
          
€ 
πWA
*** + 1−π( )WB*** = u + π 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ) + 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E ;        (6’) 
 
          
€ 
u + 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ) − 1−π( ) pC + pN −1( )E ≤WA***  
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€ 
≤ u + π 1− pC( ) + 1−π( ) pN{ } RB − RA( ).        (7’) 
 
The following proposition is obtained. 
 
Proposition 3: There exist   
€ 
WA
*** ≥ 0  and   
€ 
WB
*** ≥ 0  satisfying (6’) and (7’). 
 
It follows from (6’) that the shareholders’ profit is 
 
       
€ 
πRA + 1−π( )RB + π 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ) −πWA*** − 1−π( )WB***  
     ( ) BA RR ππ −+= 1   
€ 
− 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E − u , 
 
which is equal to (3). Thus, in Case 1, introduction of legal liability sanctions for 
breaches of fiduciary duty to shareholders has consequently no effect on managerial 
incentive schemes. This means that the shareholders prefer Case 1 over Case 3 because, 
even if the shareholders can efficiently set managerial incentive schemes, their profit in 
Case 3 becomes (17) which is less than (3). Therefore, it is sufficient to ascertain 
whether the shareholders choose Case 1 or Case 2. 
     In Case 2, the manager’s participation constraint is (8) because legal liability 
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sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty are never imposed on the manager who chooses 
Project B . The manager’s incentive compatibility constraints are 
 
          
€ 
WB − pC E ≥WA − 1− pC( ) RB − RA( );                               (9’) 
 
           
€ 
WB − 1− pN( )E ≥WA − pN RB − RA( ).      
 
Because the latter inequality is assured by inequality (9’), the shareholders maximize 
their profit BB WR −  subject to 0≥AW , 0≥BW , (8) and (9’). This is equivalent to 
minimizing   
€ 
WB  subject to 0≥AW , 0≥BW , (8) and (9’). The shareholders have to 
satisfy the manager’s incentive compatibility constraint   
€ 
WB ≥ pC E − 1− pC( ) RB − RA( )  
that is obtained from inequalities (9’) and 0≥AW . However, the manager’s 
participation constraint is (8). Therefore, the nonnegative constraint of managerial 
compensation is binding if and only if 
 
          
€ 
pC E − 1− pC( ) RB − RA( )  
€ 
> u 
  
€ 
+ πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E ,               (20) 
 
which is equivalent to  
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€ 
pC >
u + 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E + RB − RA
1−π( )E + RB − RA
.                             (20’) 
 
The right-hand side of (20’) is greater than that of (18’). That is, introduction of legal 
liability sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty to shareholders mitigates the 
nonnegative constraint of managerial compensation. If (20’) is satisfied, 
 
        0*** =AW ;                                                  (10”) 
 
          
€ 
WB
*** = pC E − 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ).                                 (11”) 
 
Point V’ in Figure 4 shows the only pair of 
  
€ 
WA
*** ,WB
***( ) in Case 2 when (20) is 
satisfied. 
     When (20) is satisfied, it is more costly for the shareholders to motivate the 
manager who is directly liable for negative externality to always choose Project B  
because the shareholders have to pay an additional reward, which is given by 
  
€ 
pC E − 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ){ }  
€ 
− u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E[ ] , to the manager for obeying 
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them (acting against social objectives). Then, the shareholders’ profit is 
 
        ***BB WR −   
€ 
= RB − pC E − 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ){ }.                       (12”) 
 
It follows from (3) and (12”) that the following proposition is obtained. 
 
Proposition 4: When managerial compensation cannot be negative, but legal liability 
sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty are imposed on the manager, the shareholders 
motivate the manager to always choose the socially optimal project if and only if 
 
        
  
€ 
pC >
π RB − RA( ) + u + 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E + RB − RA
E + RB − RA
.                  (19’) 
 
The right-hand side of this inequality is greater than that of (19) because 
  
€ 
π RB − RA( ) + u + 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E
E
<1. Inequality (19’) can be transformed into 
 
       
€ 
π RB − pC E( ) − RA{ } <
  
€ 
pC E − 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ){ }
WB
***
           
− u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E[ ]
WB
*
             
, 
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which shows that introduction of fiduciary duty lowers the right-hand side of this 
inequality by   
€ 
1− pC( ) RB − RA( ) . This corresponds to the shift of point V to V’ in Figure 
4. If  
 
       
€ 
1− pC( ) RB − RA( ) ≥ pC E ,                                          (21) 
 
the negative constraint of managerial compensation can be perfectly removed by legal 
liability sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty. This means that point V’ is below 
point U. Parameters exist satisfying inequality (21) conditional on (18’). It follows from 
(21) that 
  
€ 
pC <
RB − RA
RB − RA + E
 must hold. Then, if Np  is sufficiently large and u  is 
sufficiently small, inequality (18’) holds for any Cp  satisfying 
  
€ 
pC <
RB − RA
RB − RA + E
 
     Thus, introduction of legal liability sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty to 
shareholders into managerial incentive schemes can lower the cost of motivating 
managers to act against social objectives and to obey shareholders. Consequently, this 
can exacerbate the conflict between shareholders’ interests and social objectives. In 
other words, reinforcement of fiduciary duty can be a substitute for negative 
compensation imposed on managers for acting against shareholders’ interests. 
113 29 
     As assumed in (1), it is socially better to prevent the firm from causing negative 
externality. However, if AB RER >−  (i.e., if negative externality can be socially 
justified), the nonnegative constraint of managerial compensation discourages the 
manager from adopting a socially optimal project selection, i.e., choosing Case 2. In this 
case, introduction of legal liability sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty to 
shareholders is socially valuable because it encourages the manager to choose Case 2. 
This means that managers should be directly liable for negative externality under a 
negligence rule: managers should be punished only when they are found culpable for 
negative externality (i.e., only when the externality cannot be socially justified). In 
contrast, under a strict liability rule: when victims are compensated irrespective of 
whether managers are found culpable or not, managers should be liable for negative 
externality if they are found culpable for the externality, while shareholders should be 
liable for negative externality if managers are not found culpable for the externality. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The social efficiency of managerial liability rules when firms may cause negative 
externality has been examined. When courts fail to adequately internalize negative 
externality, shareholders’ interests often are not consistent with social objectives. 
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Consequently, when a penalty is directly imposed on managers for acting against social 
objectives, a penalty for acting against shareholders’ interests is also necessary to 
motivate managers to obey shareholders (to act against social objectives). However, 
shareholders have difficulty in imposing a penalty (negative compensation) on 
managers without legal processes. Thus, the nonnegative constraint of managerial 
compensation makes it infeasible to impose the latter penalty on managers; it forces  
shareholders to pay additional rewards to managers for obeying them. This can raise the 
cost of motivating managers to act against social objectives and can mitigate the conflict 
between shareholders’ interests and social objectives. However, when shareholders are 
directly liable for negative externality, the nonnegative constraint of managerial 
compensation is not binding. Therefore, shareholders motivate managers to obey them 
(to act against social objectives). Hence, there is a social difference between legal 
liability for negative externality being imposed on shareholders or on managers. 
Introduction of legal liability sanctions for breaches of fiduciary duty to shareholders 
into managerial incentive schemes can be a substitute for negative compensation paid to 
managers and may exacerbate the conflict between shareholders’ interests and social 
objectives. 
     Thus, I suggest that managers, not shareholders, should be directly liable for 
115 31 
negative externality caused by corporate activities, and managers’ fiduciary duty to 
shareholders should be restricted. In other words, managers should not just be agents of 
shareholders who are directly liable for negative externality, and managers’ fiduciary 
duty should be balanced with other legal liabilities imposed on them. This paper 
provides a new insight into exploring corporate governance in relation to corporate 
social responsibilities.  
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Appendix 
 
Proof of Proposition 1: If the legal liability for the external harm   
€ 
E  is imposed on the 
shareholders, the profit maximization problems in Cases 1~3 are as follows. 
     In Case 1, the shareholders offer the following managerial compensation: paying 
AW  when AR  is realized and Project   
€ 
B  is found liable for negative externality; 
paying   
€ 
WA −α  when AR  is realized and Project   
€ 
B is found innocent for negative 
externality; paying BW  when BR  is realized and Project   
€ 
B is found innocent for 
negative externality; paying   
€ 
WB −β  when BR  is realized and Project   
€ 
B is found 
liable for negative externality. The manager’s participation constraint is 
 
          
€ 
πWA + 1−π( )WB −π 1− pC( )α − 1−π( ) 1− pN( )β ≥ u .                (A. 1) 
 
The manager’s incentive compatibility constraints are 
 
       
€ 
WA − 1− pC( )α ≥WB − pCβ ; 
 
       
€ 
WB − 1− pN( )β ≥WA − pNα , 
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which are equivalent to  
 
          
€ 
1− pN( )β − pNα ≤WB −WA ≤ pCβ − 1− pC( )α .                     (A. 2) 
 
The shareholders maximize their profit   
€ 
πRA + 1−π( )RB   
€ 
− 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E AWπ−  
  
€ 
− 1−π( )WB + π 1− pC( )α + 1−π( ) 1− pN( )β  subject to (A. 1) and (A. 2). This is 
equivalent to minimizing   
€ 
πWA + 1−π( )WB  subject to (A. 1) and (A. 2). Therefore, 
 
          
€ 
πWA
* + 1−π( )WB* = u + π 1− pC( )α + 1−π( ) 1− pN( )β ; 
                                                                  (A. 3) 
          
€ 
u + 1− pC( )α − 1−π( ) pC + pN −1( )β ≤WA*  
                            
€ 
≤ u + 1− pC( )α + 1−π( ) pC + pN −1( )α . 
 
It follows from (A. 3) that the shareholders’ profit is 
 
      
€ 
πRA + 1−π( )RB   
€ 
− 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E   
€ 
−πWA
*
  
€ 
− 1−π( )WB* + π 1− pC( )α + 1−π( ) 1− pN( )β  
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€ 
= πRA + 1−π( )RB   
€ 
− 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E   
€ 
−u , 
 
which is equal to (3). It is clear that using a single penalty system (i.e., using only α  
or only 
€ 
β ), the manager can be motivated to choose Case 1. 
     In Case 2, the shareholders maximize their profit   
€ 
RB −   
€ 
πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E  
  
€ 
−WB  subject to the participation constraint   
€ 
WB ≥ u  and the incentive compatibility 
constraint   
€ 
WB ≥WA. In this case, the shareholders need not impose any penalty on the 
manager because an inequality   
€ 
WB ≥WA is sufficient to motivate him/her to always 
choose Project   
€ 
B. Therefore, 
 
          
€ 
WB
* = u ;                                                   (A. 4) 
 
          
€ 
WA
* ≤ u .                                                   (A. 5) 
 
It follows from (A. 4) that the shareholders’ profit is 
 
       
€ 
RB −   
€ 
πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E   
€ 
−WB
*
  
€ 
= RB − πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E − u , 
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which is equal to (12). 
     In Case 3, the shareholders maximize their profit AA WR −  subject to the 
participation constraint   
€ 
WA ≥ u  and the incentive compatibility constraint   
€ 
WA ≥WB . As 
in Case 2, the shareholders need not impose any penalty on the manager because an 
inequality   
€ 
WA ≥WB  is sufficient to motivate him/her to always choose Project   
€ 
A . 
Therefore, 
 
        uWA =
* ;                                                   (A. 6) 
 
          
€ 
WB ≤ u .                                                   (A. 7) 
 
It follows from (A. 6) that the shareholders’ profit is (17). 
     Hence, there is no social difference between whether legal liability for negative 
externality is directly imposed on the shareholders or on the manager. 
 
Proof of Proposition 2: Because the shareholders prefer Case 1 to Case 3, it is sufficient 
to ascertain the condition under which the shareholders prefer Case 1 to Case 2, i.e., the 
condition under which (3) is greater than (12’). This condition is given by 
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€ 
RB − pC E <  
€ 
πRA + 1−π( )RB − 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E − u ,  
 
which is equivalent to (19). 
 
Proof of Proposition 3: It follows from (6’) that ***BW  is a decreasing function of 
***
AW  
and 
  
€ 
WB
*** =
u + π 1− pC( ) RB − RA( )
1−π
+ 1− pN( )E > 0  is satisfied when 0*** =AW . Let 
  
€ 
WA
1,WB
1( )  denote a pair of   
€ 
WA ,WB( )  that maximizes   
€ 
WA  subject to (6’) and (7’). Let 
  
€ 
WA
2 ,WB
2( )  denote a pair of   
€ 
WA ,WB( )  that maximizes   
€ 
WB  subject to (6’) and (7’). 
Solving (6’) and (7’) yields 
 
     
  
€ 
WA
1 = u + π 1− pC( ) + 1−π( ) pN{ } RB − RA( ) > 0 ; 
 
     
  
€ 
WB
2 = u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E > 0 . 
 
If 02 ≥AW , then 
120 AA WW <≤  and 
20 BW<  are satisfied. Hence, a pair of 
  
€ 
WA
2 ,WB
2( )  is an example of   
€ 
WA
*** ,WB
***( )  satisfying Proposition 3. If 02 <AW , then 
12 0 AA WW <<  and >
2
BW
  
€ 
u + π 1− pC( ) RB − RA( )
1−π   
€ 
+ 1− pN( )E 0>  are satisfied. Hence, a 
121
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pair of 
  
€ 
0,
u + π 1− pC( ) RB − RA( )
1−π
+ 1− pN( )E
⎛ 
⎝ 
⎜ 
⎜ 
⎞ 
⎠ 
⎟ 
⎟  is an example of   
€ 
WA
*** ,WB
***( ) 
satisfying Proposition 3. 
 
Proof of Proposition 4: It follows from (1) that (19’) assures (20). Therefore, the 
shareholders motivate the manager to always choose the socially optimal project if and 
only if (3) is greater than (12”), i.e., if and only if 
 
     
  
€ 
RB − pC E − 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ){ } <  
€ 
πRA + 1−π( )RB − 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E − u ,  
 
which is equivalent to (19’). 
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                                  BW      
              PC                          1IC     
                                 Q                           2IC  
                           S  
P  
                                           T   
                                  
                                   R  
                                                                 AW  
PC : the borderline of the participation constraint 
                         
€ 
πWA + 1−π( )WB − 1−π( ) 1− pN( )E = u ; 
1IC : the borderline of the incentive constraint 
              when the firm will cause negative externality ACB WEpW =− ; 
2IC : the borderline of the incentive constraint 
        when the firm will involve no negative externality ( ) ANB WEpW =−− 1 ; 
P: 
  
€ 
0,u 1−π( ) + 1− pN( )E( ) ;  Q:   
€ 
0, pC E( ) ;  R:   
€ 
0, 1− pN( )E( ) ; 
S: 
  
€ 
u − 1−π( ) pC + pN −1( )E,u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E( ) ;  T:   
€ 
u , u + 1− pN( )E( ) 
Figure 1 
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BW  
                                                1IC  
                    
                                 V       
                                  
                           PC  
                                            
                                                               AW  
                                                                                                     
PC :   
€ 
WB − πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E = u ; 
1IC : ACB WEpW =− ; 
U: 
  
€ 
0,u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E( ) ;  V: ( )EpC,0 ; 
W: 
  
€ 
u − 1−π( ) pC + pN −1( )E,u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E( )  
Figure 2 
 
 
U W 
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            BW          PC            
                       
                                                             2IC  
                                  
                                              Y  
                            
                                 X 
                                                               AW  
                                    
                                                                  
PC : uWA = ; 
2IC :   
€ 
WB − 1− pN( )E =WA; 
X: 
  
€ 
0, 1− pN( )E( ) ;  Y:   
€ 
u , u + 1− pN( )E( ); 
Figure 3 
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BW  
                                                 
                                 V               1IC  
                                        
                                    V’ 
                           PC  
                                            
                                                               AW  
                                    
PC: 
  
€ 
WB − πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E = u ; 
1IC : ACB WEpW =− ; 
U: 
  
€ 
0,u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E( ) ;  V:   
€ 
0, pC E( ) ;  V’:   
€ 
0, pC E − 1− pC( ) RB − RA( )( ) ; 
W: 
  
€ 
u − 1−π( ) pC + pN −1( )E,u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E( ) ; 
W’: 
  
€ 
u + 1− pC( ) RB − RA( ) − 1−π( ) pC + pN −1( )E,u + πpC + 1−π( ) 1− pN( ){ }E( ) 
Figure 4 
 
U W W’ 
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